1376 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Chief Justice Warren, for himself and three justices, held that expatriation for desertion was a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Judge Brennan agreed, not having the required relationship between the Statute and the war powers of Congress. For the four dissenters, Justice Frankfurter argued that Congress had the power to impose loss of citizenship for certain activities and that there was a rational connection between the denial of a citizenship requirement and the revocation of citizenship. Justice Frankfurter denied that the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment and denied that it was a sentence “in a valid constitutional sense.” Id., p. 124. “The right of any person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or restricted on the basis of race or sex or because that person is married. 1332 However, any person “who defends or teaches an organization or is a member or associate of an organization that defends or teaches for an organization. Then, under President Abraham Lincoln, Attorney General Edward Bates included Dred Scott in an 1862 legal opinion arguing that free blacks could generally be American citizens. Eventually, the Republican Congress enshrined the principle of citizenship in the first major civil rights law in the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Two months later, Congress included the birthright in its Fourteenth Amendment bill. A central point in the citizenship controversy was the Supreme Court`s 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Dred Scott, who had been held as a slave, sued his former master`s executor under federal jurisdiction over state citizenship, seeking a declaration that he had become free because his master had voluntarily brought him into free territory. Taney C.J. concluded that Scott was not a citizen of a state for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction because the Constitution implicitly restricted state citizenship and national citizenship on racial grounds and generally excluded people of African descent like Scott. This and other aspects of Taney`s analysis were strongly contested by the court`s dissenters and others, who noted that free blacks had in fact been considered citizens by many states when they were founded. Chief Justice Marshall stated at the beginning of the saying that “[a] naturalized citizen. becomes a member of society, has all the rights of an indigenous citizen and, according to the Constitution, stands on the basis of an indigenous citizen. The Constitution does not authorize Congress to extend or limit these powers. The mere power of the national legislature is to impose a uniform rule on naturalisation and the exercise of this power exhausts it, provided that it respects the individual. 1345 A similar idea was expressed in Knauer v.
United States.1346 “Citizenship acquired by naturalization is not second-class citizenship. [She] brings with her the privilege of participating fully in the affairs of our society, including the right to speak freely, to criticize public servants and directors, and to promote changes in our laws, including our government`s charter. In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230)(C.C.E.D.Pa., 1823), one of the first cases concerning the privilege and immunity clause, concluded that the clause protects certain fundamental rights of all citizens. In slaughterhouses, however, 83 36 (1873), the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation on the grounds that the privileges of national citizenship were substantial but resulted from the federal government, the Constitution, or other laws. Fundamental natural rights have not been taken into account, so that the equality function of the privilege and immunity clause has been replaced by the equality safeguard clause and the substantive functions of the due process clause.
